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The Three Grammars and the Sign 
 
Charles Denroche 
Univeristy of Westminster 
 
This article presents an original three-component model of the linguistic sign. It 
shares with the established triadic models of Peirce (1955 [1897]) and Ogden & 
Richards (1923/1949) in identifying THOUGHT, WORD and THING as essential 
components; but differs in being linear, with THOUGHT and THING at opposite 
poles. It is argued that this arrangement reflects the way the components of the 
sign relate to reality and thereby serves well as an explanatory tool for linguistic 
research. The model is further modified at each of the ontological realms using 
concepts from cognitive linguistics, renamed COGNITION, LANGUAGE and 
REALITY. The new model is employed as a research tool in two case studies: one 
illustrates its use in making sense of the complex field of language grammar; the 
other does the same for figurative language – metaphor and metonymy. The 
article’s conclusions include that interrogating established cornerstones of 
linguistic theory in the light of new theory can lead to the development of 
improved research tools.  
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Research in linguistics can go in two directions. It can either use the linguistic 
knowledge we are endowed with for the tools it offers in understanding particular 
language contexts, such as language contact, multilingualism or translanguaging; 
or it can step back and look at the tools themselves in order to deliver more 
precise instruments at the service of linguistic research. In this article, I am 
concerned with the latter. The area of linguistic knowledge I am revisiting is 
semiotics, and, in particular, the models of the sign developed by Saussure, Peirce 
and Ogden & Richards. The result of this enquiry is my own triadic model of the 
linguistic sign, presented in Section 2, which by being linear rather than 
triangular, intends to reflect more keenly the linear ‘route’ from mind, through the 
interface of language, to the external or ‘real’ world. In Section 3, the basic linear 
model is modified at each of the three realms, using concepts from cognitive 
linguistics to meet criticisms levelled at triadic models. The realms are renamed 
COGNITION, LANGUAGE and REALITY. 
This is not a philosophical investigation, a ‘drilling down’, for its own 
sake. My purpose is to develop a framework which can be used to overview and 
map the complexities of multi-disciplinary areas of linguistics. The author’s 
model of the triadic sign is especially useful when overviewing areas of enquiry 
dealing with language in use, such as discourse analysis, sociolinguistics, 
language teaching and translation/interpreting. There is evidence in the literature 
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that this sort of framework has proved useful in the past. Benjamin Whorf’s 
selected writings from the 1920-40s, for example, were collected together under 
the title Language, Thought, and Reality (Whorf 1956), and John Lyons’s short 
book overviewing twenty-five years of developments in semantics has the title 
Language, Meaning and Context (Lyons 1981). Both identify the three 
ontological realms, in the same order but using their own glosses, as a useful 
meta-framework to overview a wide-ranging field.  
In Sections 4 and 5, I offer two case studies showing how the linear triadic 
model of the sign can help rationalize the complexities of particular areas of 
endeavour in linguistics. Section 4 looks at grammar and argues that the 
innumerable systems describing the grammar of language conform to three broad 
approaches, which can be characterized as GENERATIVE, FUNCTIONAL or 
COGNITIVE – referred to in the rest of the article as the ‘Three Grammars’. In that 
section, I map the Three Grammars onto the linear triadic model of the sign, 
showing how each represents a shift to one of the three realms of the linguistic 
sign: the main focus of generative grammar is language as an autonomous system, 
the realm of LANGUAGE; functional grammar focusses on real and imagined 
worlds, the realm of REALITY; and cognitive grammar on conceptualization and 
mental processes, the realm of COGNITION. In Section 5, I show how research into 
figurative language, metaphor and metonymy, also reflects the three realms of the 
sign, and how the triadic model has been used to classify types of metonymy. I 
also discuss how grammar systems have treated figurative language, and why. 
Section 6 offers concluding remarks. 
To some, it may seem audacious, even heretical, to question established 
cornerstones of linguistics such as Saussure’s, Peirce’s or Ogden & Richards’ 
models of the sign and to suggest that they might be improved upon, but I believe 
that returning to the basics and interrogating existing theory is a duty, especially 
as theory developed in more recent times can refine and develop theory developed 
in previous times. This article also suggests that cognitive linguistics offers 
powerful tools for analysing linguistic data, especially in areas of language in use, 
because of its emphasis on thought; and that cognitive grammar offers especially 
rich and naturalistic tools of research compared to the other grammars by getting 




2. Modelling the sign – developing a linear triadic model 
 
The model of the sign most referred to in linguistics and applied language studies 
is Saussure’s dyadic model from his sémiologie with its two components, 
signifiant and signifié (Saussure 1916: 66-67) – known in English as ‘signifier’ 
and ‘signified’ from Wade Baskin’s translation (Saussure 1916/1959) but also 
‘signal’ (sound pattern) and ‘signification’ (concept) in Roy Harris’s translation 
(Saussure 1916/1983). Saussure famously defines the linguistic sign in terms of 
the association between a concept and an acoustic image and not with reference to 
objects in the world or ‘denotata’: “Le signe linguistique unit non une chose et un 
nom, mais un concept et une image acoustique [author’s translation: “A linguistic 
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sign does not associate a thing with a name but a concept with a sound pattern”] 
(Saussure 1916: 66).  
Saussure’s omission of the referent was no oversight and deliberately 
diverged from the thinking of the time: he wished to foreground the immaterial 
aspects of signs over their referential function and thereby highlight language as 
an arbitrary and relational autonomous system; or, as Johansen puts it, Saussure’s 
decision to focus on ‘signs without worlds’ was the “fateful moment when 
Saussure deliberately broke the circuit of speech to establish a vantage point from 
which it is possible to study language as a system” (Johansen 1993: ix). Jakobson 
and Hjelmslev follow Saussure in working with two-component ‘signs without 
objects’ models: Jakobson’s signans denotes the material component of language 
and signatum its meaning (Jakobson 1968: 699); while in Hjelmslev’s 
glossematics, glossemes (signs) consist of expression (form) and content 
(meaning) elements, extendable along the plane of ‘substance-form’ (Hjelmslev 
1943/1953). 
Triadic models of the sign remedy this omission by including referents, the 
‘things’ words stand for, in addition to the two elements of Saussure’s model, 
concepts and sound patterns. Peirce’s writing is pre-eminent here. Already in the 
early period of his work in the 1860s, Peirce was modelling the sign or 
‘representation’ as a semiotic triad consisting of: the sign-vehicle (later 
representamen), i.e. the realm of WORD; the interpretant, the realm of THOUGHT; 
and object, the realm of THING (Atkin 2013). These ideas were developed in his 
interim account, presented in a lecture series at Harvard in 1903, to give a 
classification of signs totalling ten in number based on whether: the ‘interpretant’ 
is a theme or dicent; the ‘object’ an icon, index or symbol; and the ‘sign-vehicle’ a 
sinsign, legisign or qualisign (Peirce 1955: 101-104) – in this classification ‘a 
spontaneous cry’, for example, is a rhematic, indexical sinsign (Atkin 2013). In 
his final account, Peirce was working with an unwieldy system of as many as 
sixty-six classes of sign (Atkin 2013). Peirce’s fascinating work is not explored 
here in further detail, nor, though relevant, are the insights of semioticians such as 
Yuri Lotman (cultural semiotics), Algirdas Greimas (the semiotic square), Charles 
Morris (behavioural semiotics), Thomas Sebeok (biosemiotics), John Deeley 
(interpretive semiotics), Roland Barthes (connotation) and Umberto Eco (natural 
signs); instead, I turn to the triadic model of Ogden & Richards (1923/1949).  
Ogden & Richards represent the three components as an equilateral 
triangle and name them ‘referent’, ‘thought/reference’ and ‘symbol’: referent 
refers to entities in the real world indexed by signs; thought or reference to ideas 
in the mind relating to those entities; and symbol to the physical vehicles of 
language, phonemes and graphemes, which represent thoughts and referents 
(Ogden & Richards 1923/1949: 11). This configuration is often referred to as the 
‘semiotic triangle’. Although Ogden & Richards’ model has less status in 
semiotics circles than Peirce’s, I give it attention here because they represent the 
sign diagrammatically to show associations between the realms, and for the 
interesting and significant feature it offers, namely, a break in the line between 
symbol and referent to indicate that no ‘causal relation’ exists between them: 
“Symbol and Referent […] are not connected directly […] but only indirectly 
round the two sides of the triangle” (1923/1949: 11-12). According to Ogden & 
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Richards, a link between symbol (WORD) and referent (THING) is made only via 
thought when a symbol is “used by someone to stand for a referent” (1923/1949: 












Figure 1 – Ogden & Richards’ (1923/1949: 11) triangular model of the sign
 
 
In order to arrive at the original linear triadic model of the sign I propose 
in this article, I start, like Ogden & Richards, with a triangle and, like them, make 
a break along one of the sides – but the break is along the side which joins thought 
and referent rather than between referent and symbol. I then open out the triangle, 
broken in this way, so the three components appear as points in a line. At one 
pole, there is THOUGHT, representing the realm of the mind, the most internal to 
the self; at the other pole, THING, representing entities and activity in the real 
world, the most external to the self; between THOUGHT and THING is WORD, the 
interface between the mind and the real world. This contradicts Ogden & Richards 
by asserting that there is a link between WORD and THING and that WORD is an 
interface between THING and THOUGHT.  
The sequence of the ontological realms in my linear model is thus 
THOUGHT-WORD-THING, though I will be designating them COGNITION, LANGUAGE 
and REALITY in the rest of the article. I have chosen these terms over the simpler 
terms, or those of Peirce (interpretant, representamen, object) and Ogden & 
Richards (thought/reference, symbol, referent), to reflect the modifications I make 
in the next section and to avoid implying that the terms from the different 
frameworks correspond exactly or that they do not have problems or dissenters. 
My purpose in devising this linear triadic model is not for its own sake, but for the 
practical purpose of arriving at a discourse model of the sign which reflects better 
the relationship of the three realms to each other and to the reality they represent. 





















Figure 2 – The author’s linear triadic model of the sign 
 
 
3.  Modifying the basic linear model of the sign using concepts from  
cognitive grammar 
 
In this section, the linear model of the sign proposed above is explored further by 
introducing three modifications, one to each of the realms of the sign, THOUGHT, 
WORD and THING. These modifications address objections which have been raised 
regarding modelling the sign as a triad and the nature of the three realms. The 
modifications I propose concern the following problematic areas: 1) the abstract 
nature of many referents; 2) the under-determinacy of signs in natural languages; 
and 3) the non-compositional nature of the meaning of signs in combination. 
Theory from cognitive linguistics, particularly Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar, 
is employed to develop these ideas. My purpose is to offer a robust theory-cum-
model of maximum usefulness as an ‘explanatory tool’ to scholars and researchers 
in their enquiries. 
 
 
3.1 Abstract things 
 
It is understandable that discussions of linguistic signs tend to start with concrete 
objects in the real world but not all referents are physical things; referents include 
COGNITION 
realm of the mind 
REALITY 
realm of the real 
world 
LANGUAGE 
realm of language – 
the interface between the mind 
and the real world 
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qualities (adjectives), actions/states of being (verbs), modifiers (adverbs), and 
broad grammatical meaning represented by function words (prepositions, 
determiners, auxiliaries and logical connectives), in other words, all the concepts 
represented by traditional parts of speech. Our lexica are rich in representations of 
notions which are abstract, concepts such as INSPIRATION, TRADITION, 
PLAUSIBILITY, as well as those which are concrete, such as RIVER, SNAKE, VAN. 
The idea that an abstract category does not have a real-world object and therefore 
only involves two of the three realms may seem like a return to Saussure’s ‘signs 
without referents’, where the realm of THING is not represented, but this is not the 
case – nor are we dealing here with what Peirce called ‘thought signs’, thoughts 
on their own without words or referents (Atkin 2013). Instead these entities can be 
characterized as meta-phenomena of the real world, phenomena we have access to 
indirectly through our senses. In this view, they do belong to the realm of THING, a 
view reinforced by the approach of cognitive grammar to grammatical classes, 
described below. 
There are three main grammatical classes (or categories) in Langacker’s 
cognitive grammar: there is a schema for nouns, a schema for verbs and a 
schema for categories where a non-processual (atemporal) relationship is the 
semantic pole (Langacker 1987: 214). The semantic pole of a grammatical class 
is determined schematically rather than prototypically, by how the concept is 
profiled rather than by its overall conceptual content (Langacker 2013: 98). Thus a 
noun is an expression which profiles a thing but is not limited to physical objects; 
a verb is an expression which profiles a process, tracking relationships through 
time; while relational classes (adjectives, adverbs, prepositions and particles) 
share with verbs in being relational but are non-processual (Langacker 2013: 99-
100). 
For Langacker, “a prototypical noun is one that names a physical object 
(e.g. spoon, car, dog, umbrella)” but events may be construed as abstract objects 
and realized with words, such as earthquake or explosion, through grouping and 
‘conceptual reification’ (Langacker 2013: 94-95). An abstract thing can be seen as 
“a set of interconnected entities which function as a single entity at a higher level 
of conceptual organization” (Langacker 2013: 107). Thus an ‘entity’ can include 
things, relations, sensations, changes, locations, quantities, dimensions, etc. 
(Langacker 2013: 98). The noun schema “makes no direct reference to physical 
entities, but only to cognitive abilities, so its applicability to abstract things poses 







3.2 The semantic narrowing of words 
 
The second modification I make to the linear model of the sign concerns under-
determinacy. Under-determinacy, the incompleteness with which signs encode 
information, is a defining characteristic of natural languages and should be 
brought into the present model. Whether we are dealing with simple or complex 
entities, spoons or washing machines, signs give access to concepts only through a 
partial representation of the realities they stand for. Languages under-determine 
(under-refer/underspecify) out of necessity rather than through any defect of 
design, for if signs were to encode fully all aspects of every entity, the system 
would be overloaded and unusable. Partial encoding makes languages workable in 
the social settings they have evolved to occupy. It also makes possible translation 
and interpreting, the transfer of meaning from one language to another (AUTHOR 
2019).  
Many scholars have identified the significance of the partial nature of 
meaning making. For Kress, representation is always partial in the making and re-
making (interpreting) of signs, “partial in relation to the object or phenomenon 
represented” but “full in relation to the sign-maker’s interest at the moment of 
making the sign” (Kress 2010: 71). Kress & Leeuwen maintain that “it is never 
the ‘whole object’ but only ever its criterial aspects which are represented” and 
that these “are represented in what seems to the sign-maker, at the moment, the 
most apt” (Kress & Leeuwen 1996: 6). Meaning making relies on pre-existing 
frames stored in the mind, referred to variously also as concepts, cognitive 
models, mental spaces, schemas and scripts. For Kress, frames are “essential for 
all meaning-making, in all modes” as “A frame defines the world to be engaged 
with; it excludes and it includes; and in doing that it shapes, presents the world 
according to the interest and the principles of those who frame” (Kress 2010: 
149). The founder of ‘frame semantics’, Fillmore, maintains that a word cannot be 
understood without reference to an innate or learned frame of experience, and that 
to understand a concept “you have to understand the whole structure in which it 
fits” (Fillmore 2006 [1982]: 373). These are ideas few would disagree with. 
The necessity of meaning making being partial brings with it a side-effect 
of great practical importance: it permits us to refer to the same scene in different 
ways. The word sweater, for example, suggests a garment which increases body 
warmth enough to make you perspire; jersey refers to the stretchy material it is 
made from; woolly (British English) indicates the material it is typically made of, 
wool; pullover reminds us that you pull the garment over your head to put it on; 
and jumper (British English) is from the French jupe, an item of clothing. In 
choosing which features we focus on when identifying a situation, we 
automatically draw attention to those features and make them ‘salient’. This 
highlighting/foregrounding is described by cognitive linguists in terms of 
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establishing a profile (figure) against a base (ground), and they see these choices 
not as arbitrary but motivated.  
The profile/base distinction is part of the larger concept of construal, “the 
speaker’s choice among alternative ways of conceptualising and describing a 
scene” (Radden & Dirven 2007: 337). Construal is “our manifest ability to 
conceive and portray the same situation in alternate ways” (Langacker 2013: 43). 
It allows us to frame and structure concepts in different ways depending on what 
is profiled but also other dimensions, such as perspective, scale and scope, and 
level of specificity (Langacker 1986: 6-13). It is construal which makes ‘the code’ 
nuanced, flexible and fit for purpose. Construal is evident in how meaning 
becomes conventionalized in the lexicon, but equally in how meaning making is 
performed by speakers ‘on the fly’ and the linguistic resources they select to meet 
immediate communicative goals. It is also evident in pragmatic inferencing, 
where the (physical, interpersonal, cognitive or co-textual) context enriches the 
partially-encoded message of a speaker’s utterance. Incorporating construal and 
the under-determinate nature of natural languages into the model reinforces our 
understanding of what constitutes the realm WORD.  
 
 
3.3 Complex thoughts 
 
The third modification to the linear model of the sign proposed in this article 
concerns words in combination. Words rarely occur alone, and when they 
combine they set up meanings not wholly predictable from our knowledge of 
them as individual units. The un-analysability of fixed phrases is a key concept in 
the field of phraseology (Cowie 1998). Sinclair observed through the analysis of 
corpus data, made possible thanks to large databases becoming available for the 
first time, that two contrasting principles were at work when words are combined, 
the ‘open-choice’ and the ‘idiom’ principles (Sinclair 1991). Prefabricated units, 
conventionalized chunks of two or more words, or ‘lexical phrases’, such as box 
office, cherry tomato, comfort break, glass ceiling, jet lag, job share, party piece, 
pigeon hole and swine flu, are invaluable in everyday communication, both in 
terms of new linguistic resources and processing demands, and are an indicator of 
native-like proficiency. Rhyme and alliteration often signal that expressions are 
lexical phrases rather than expressions arrived at through free combination, such 
as the assonances in: surf and turf, a restaurant menu which contains both fish and 
meat; prick and ping, you ‘prick’ the film on a microwavable meal and a ‘ping’ 
indicates it is ready: and flash to bang, where ‘flash’ indicates the radicalization of 
an individual and ‘bang’ the committing of a terrorist act.  
Cognitive linguists identify an even more basic principle, that of 
construction. In Langacker’s cognitive grammar, language consists of symbolic 
 9 
structures, which have a phonological and a semantic pole; these combine into 
‘assemblies’, with two or more assemblies being called a ‘construction’ – the 
symbolic structures jar and lid, for example, combine to form the symbolic 
assembly jar lid (Langacker 2013: 164-5). These are then built up into “more and 
more elaborate symbolic expressions” (Langacker 1986: 29). For this reason, 
Langacker’s cognitive grammar is described as a construction grammar, a 
category of grammars to which Goldberg’s Construction Grammar’ (1995) and 
Croft’s Radical Construction Grammar’ (2001) also belong. What is important 
about constructions and assemblies is that they have their own internal structure 
where “the composite structure is not merely the sum of the component 
structures” but “an entity in its own right […] with emergent properties not 
inherited or strictly predicable from the components” (Langacker 2013: 164).  
 
To summarize, far from undoing the basic division of the linguistic sign 
into the three ontological realms, THING, WORD and THOUGHT, the proposed 
modifications serve to reinforce them and acknowledge the structural complexity 
within each realm, making the model more robust and a better explanatory tool for 
linguistic research. The modifications made to the realms of the triadic sign using 
concepts from cognitive grammar consolidate the model by meeting criticisms of 
the model, while the linear arrangement reflects the reality they represent more 
faithfully than a triangular arrangement. The concept of reification was applied at 
the realm of THING to accommodate the notion of ‘abstract things’; the concept of 
construal was applied at the realm of WORD to accommodate ‘semantic 
narrowing’; and the concept of construction was applied at the realm of THOUGHT 
to accommodate ‘complex thoughts’. In order to reflect that the realms in the 
author’s model differ through their modifications to the earlier models I am 
naming the realms: REALITY, LANGUAGE and COGNITION. This is summarized 
graphically in Figure 3. In the next two sections, I give case studies to show the 
insights the model can give in the fields of grammar (Section 4) and figurative 





















4.  Case Study 1 – Grammar 
 
In this first case study, I look at grammar and how different approaches to 
grammar relate to the realms of the linguistic sign. Theorizing about language 
often leads to something which gets called ‘grammar’. As a consequence, there is 
a vast and bewildering array of different grammar systems to describe English, 
and many more when we consider other languages. Although numerous, the 
different systems fit (fairly neatly) into three broad categories: GENERATIVE, 
FUNCTIONAL and COGNITIVE. In this article, these three approaches are referred to 
collectively as the ‘Three Grammars’.  
In Sections 4.1-4.3 below, I describe the essential tenets of the generative, 
functionalist and cognitivist programmes. The foundational texts of the three 
approaches, Chomsky (1957, 1965), Halliday (1985) and Langacker (1987), are 
employed to do this. In these early texts, we see these influential language theories 
emerging for the first time, like photographic plates developing in the darkroom. 
They represent three different schools, established by different individuals 
working at different times in different contexts, and were designed to do different 
things. It may therefore be questioned whether they should be considered together 
at all – and whether visual grammars such as Kress & Leeuwen’s (1996) are 
grammars. I feel it is legitimate to do so as the generative, functional and 
cognitive accounts are all systematic descriptions of language, attempts to 
understand the underlying principles which operate behind natural languages in 
Semantic narrowing 
 
The realm of LANGUAGE 
is modified to include 
under-determinacy, 
construal and the partial 




The realm of COGNITION 
is modified to include 
construction and 
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The realm of REALITY 
is modified to include 




use. Following this definition, to call the three approaches ‘grammars’ is certainly 
more than incidental or a metaphor or pun.  
The Three Grammars split out as being distinct because they represent 
three different foci within language description, each approach representing a shift 
to one of the ontological realms of the triadic model: the shift in GENERATIVE 
grammar is to LANGUAGE, in FUNCTIONAL grammar, to REALITY, and in 
COGNITIVE grammar, to COGNITION. As they present different foci they are related 
and complementary rather than competing. In Section 4.4, I compare the Three 
Grammars in terms of how they relate to the realms of the linear triadic model of 
the sign in more depth. 
 
 
4.1 Generative grammar 
 
Generative grammars explore language from a position shifted towards the 
ontological realm of LANGUAGE, emphasizing language as an autonomous, 
modular and self-contained system, where structure/form is the focus of interest 
over meaning. They are also, as a consequence, shifted away from language as 
communication in a real-world context. It was Noam Chomsky’s belief that 
‘traditional grammars’ left “unexpressed many of the basic regularities of the 
language with which they are concerned” (Chomsky 1965: 5) and that a 
‘mentalistic’ linguistic theory, one which reveals “a mental reality underlying 
actual behaviour” (1965: 4), was needed. The grammar Chomsky devised to meet 
this need, outlined in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, the foundational work of 
the generative programme, analyses language down to an underlying 
mathematical and logical core, an innate competence applying universally to all 
languages and involving a very small number of algorithmic rules for which there 
are no exceptions. It is a grammar which presents “a system of rules that in some 
explicit and well-defined way assigns structural descriptions to sentences” 
(Chomsky 1965: 8). Phrase-structure, morphophonemic and transformation rules, 
and parametric settings specific to each language, are added to a universal 
grammar of abstract principles. It is a grammar motivated by parsimony and 
learnability which emphasizes ‘well-formedness’ (1965: 3), ‘grammaticalness’ 
(1965: 11) and the ‘linguistic intuitions of the native speaker’ (1965: 3, 24).  
There have been many developments in generative grammar since 
Chomsky’s early pioneering work; but, though many and varied, they all 
ultimately derive from the ‘standard theory’ of 1965. Many of these are not just 
modifications but new theories in their own right. Croft lists formalist theories 
which had active practitioners at the end of the twentieth century: “Minimalist 
Program, Montague Grammar, Relational Grammar, Head-Driven Phrase 
Structure Grammar and Lexical-Functional Grammar” (Croft 1998: 88). 
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According to Newmeyer, developments in formalism went in two directions: 
those led by Chomsky and his associates based on ‘principles and parameters’, 
particularly ‘government and binding’ and its sub-theories in the 1980s and 
‘minimalism’ in the 1990s; and those led by other scholars, such as lexical-
functional grammar, relational grammar, (generalized and head-driven) phrase 
structure grammar and categorial grammar (Newmeyer 1998: 11).  
The shift of formal approaches towards the realm of LANGUAGE gives rise 
to descriptions of language (grammars) which are not usage based, not concerned 
with frequency or variation, not socially or culturally contextualized, and which 
do not offer a speaker/hearer model, and so lack many of the features which 
characterize ‘language as communication’. Forming utterances is viewed in terms 
of competence rather than performance: “A performance model must certainly 
incorporate a grammar; it is not to be confused with a grammar” (Chomsky 1965: 
151). The model we are given does not therefore immediately provide us with a 
tool for describing discourse or features relating to idiolectic, interpersonal, social 
and cultural variation. This shift towards LANGUAGE not only means a shift away 
from representation of the real world, the realm of REALITY, but also a shift away 
from an in-depth examination of the mental processes associated with language 
manipulation, the realm of COGNITION. 
 
 
4.2 Functional grammar 
 
Functional grammars, in contrast, represent a shift towards the ontological realm 
of REALITY. They are concerned with the representation of human activity in the 
real world in all its manifestations. A functional grammar is a system first and 
then a structure, a semantic network of systems with the potential for representing 
real and imagined worlds in all their complexities. The grammar the late Michael 
Halliday presents in An Introduction to Functional Grammar (1985 and later 
editions) is “an extravagant theory, not a parsimonious one” (1985: xix), 
reminiscent of a thesaurus in its encyclopaedic breadth. “We shall define language 
as ‘meaning potential’: that is, as sets of options, or alternatives in meaning, that 
are available to the speaker-hearer” (Halliday 1973: 72). 
This is a significant departure from Chomsky, and an approach opposite to 
traditional grammar’s, in being a grammar which starts with meaning rather than 
form, identifying forms first and then asking what those forms mean: “A language 
is interpreted as a system of meanings, accompanied by forms through which the 
meanings can be realized” (1985: xiv). A functional grammar is socially situated, 
characterizing language as ‘social semiotic’, offering a usage-based, performance 
model, and one which is statistical where “probabilities […] are an important part 
of the grammar” (Halliday 1985: xxii). Here ‘functional’ indicates not only 
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‘meaning’ but purposeful meaning in its social context, ‘meaning in use’. As a 
consequence, it is a ‘natural grammar’ in the sense that grammatical sequences 
(syntagms or ‘wordings’) are meaningful and naturally configured (Halliday 1985: 
xv).  
For Halliday, grammar is the “central processing unit of a language” 
(Halliday 1985: xxxiv), the key to “cracking the code” (1985: xxxi), a semantic 
grammar describing semantically-relevant choices. “Without a grammar in the 
system, it would be impossible to mean more than one thing at once. In order to 
understand how language works, therefore, we have to engage with the grammar” 
(1985: xxxv). It is a ‘choice’ rather than a ‘chain’ grammar, “a grammar of 
choices rather than of rules” (Halliday 1978: 4), concerned with paradigmatic 
choices and the full meaning potential of the language system, rather than the 
analysis of ready-made syntagmatic associations. Generative grammars are 
syntagmatic; functional grammars are paradigmatic. Instead of rules we are 
presented with networks of choices; instead of the top-down phrase-structure 
diagrams, representing immediate syntagmatic associations, we are presented with 
left-to-right branching diagrams, representing paradigmatic choice.  
Halliday dispenses with the traditional divide between grammar and lexis, 
all linguistic resources being placed instead on the same continuum, “part of the 
same level in the code” (Halliday 1985: xiv). There is “only one network of 
lexicogrammatical options” which all lie on the same scale of ‘delicacy’, from less 
to more specific, where “the lexicon […] is simply the most delicate grammar” 
(Halliday 1978: 43). All types of process and their sub-divisions (field) are 
included in the system, as well as all types of modality and expression of mood 
(tenor), and all information-structure and textual-cohesion phenomena (mode) – 
hence the designation ‘Systemic Functional Grammar’.  
Each message, according to Halliday, involves a ‘process’ and each 
process “is either about doing, or about thinking, or about being”, which is further 
subdivided: “if it is about doing, this is either plain action or action on something; 
if acting on something it is either creating or dealing with something already 
created, and so on …” (Halliday 1985: xiv). In the second edition of An 
Introduction to Functional Grammar, Halliday introduces a graphic showing the 
inter-relationships between the processes as a wheel (Halliday 1994:108 and 
cover). The processes are ordered, “they form a circle not a line” or, better, a 
sphere (though this would be difficult to handle); “our model of experience, as 
interpreted through the grammatical system of transitivity, is one of regions within 
a continuous space; but the continuity is not between two poles, it is round in a 
loop” (Halliday 1994:107).  
What a functional grammar of a specific language looks like ultimately 
depends on the level of detail of the analysis. It provides a semantic map showing 
how language resources provide a network of interlocking systems of meaning, 
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simultaneously at different ranks and in a hierarchical relationship. An 
Introduction to Functional Grammar is midway between an abstract description 
of the networks of the system and a full description of English in all its detail. I 
have presented functional grammar through the lens of Halliday’s grammar, but 
there is a very extensive body of scholarship under the umbrella of functional 
grammar which takes Halliday’s ideas further for English and other languages. 
The tenets of Halliday’s grammar hold for functional grammars generally; they 
represent a shift towards the realm of REALITY and away from the realm of 
LANGUAGE and COGNITION. 
 
 
4.3 Cognitive grammar 
 
The cognitive grammar Ronald Langacker sets out in Foundations of Cognitive 
Grammar (1987) is also a semantic grammar, and shares with functional grammar 
in being concerned with usage. What separates the two is that they are grammars 
with different emphases: functional grammar represents a shift towards the 
ontological realm of the REALITY, mapping how real-world contexts are realized in 
language; while cognitive grammar represents a shift towards the realm of 
COGNITION, exploring how the linguistic mind is configured and grammar as a 
vehicle of conceptualization relating to non-language mental activities. Or as 
Nuyts puts it: functional grammar equates meaning with communication and 
language functioning externally in the real world; while cognitive grammar 
equates meaning with conceptualization and the representation of thought through 
language (Nuyts 2005: 70-72). 
In Langacker’s grammar, the linguistic resources of syntax and lexis are 
seen as meaningful symbolic elements on the same spectrum (as in functional 
grammar), a continuum from schematic (grammatical) to specific (lexical) 
meaning: “Lexicon and grammar form a continuum of symbolic elements” 
(Langacker 1986: 13). Each symbolic unit has a semantic and a phonological 
‘pole’ existing in semantic and phonological ‘space’ (Langacker 1987). These 
symbolic units combine to form ‘assemblies’, composite expressions which have 
unique internal structures. Assemblies of two or more symbolic structures are 
called constructions which speakers build up into more and more elaborate 
composite expressions (Langacker 1986: 29). A cognitive grammar of a language 
is an inventory of conventional symbolic units but one which is structured to 
indicate relationships between symbols (Langacker 1987: 489).  
Langacker rejects the idea of any underlying hidden or ‘deep’ grammatical 
structure; “grammatical structure is almost entirely overt” Langacker 1987: 27). 
Rather than generative rules explaining the combination of words and morphemes, 
the symbolic units themselves guide how language elements combine and by 
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identifying constructions as only weakly compositional, cognitive grammar rejects 
the significance of generative processes. There are no rules of combination; 
instead, generalizations about patterns of usage, ‘schemas’, partially or fully 
‘sanction’ the combining of symbolic units in new utterances, some patterns being 
more ‘entrenched’ (conventionalized) than others. Rules are replaced by lists, the 
idea of well-formedness by the notion of entrenchment, and compositionality by 
construction – hence the designation of Langacker’s grammar as a ‘construction 
grammar’.  
This account presents cognitive grammar through the lens of Langacker’s 
foundational work. As with the other grammars, this early work encapsulates the 
basic tenets of the cognitive approach, but the literature in this area is extensive 
and complex, including other construction grammars, such as Goldberg’s 
‘construction grammar’ (1995) and Croft’s ‘radical construction grammar’ (2001). 
They have in common that they are all ventures in language description involving 




4.4 The Three Grammars and the value of a semiotics perspective  
 
I have outlined above how a semiotic perspective can provide a heuristic tool for 
understanding why scholars have given different accounts of grammar and why 
grammars fall into three types. I have indicated in Sections 4.1-4.3 that each of the 
three approaches to grammar, overviewed through the lens of the foundational works 
of Chomsky, Halliday and Langacker, reflects a shift towards one of the three 
ontological realms of the sign: GENERATIVE grammar, a shift towards the LANGUAGE, 
language as an object of study in itself at the interface between the mind and the 
outside world, viewing language as modular and concerned only peripherally with 
meaning and representation; FUNCTIONAL grammar, a shift towards things and events 
in the real world and imagined versions of them, the realm of the REALITY, in order 
to understand the world of action and how meaning is realized by the language 
system; and COGNITIVE grammar, a shift in the opposite direction, towards language 
processing in the mind and exploring the common ground between language 
processing and other mental activities, the realm of COGNITION. The relationship 
between the Three Grammars and the linear triadic model of the sign is represented 
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Figure 4  Relationship between the Three Grammars and the realms of the sign 
 
 
Generative, functional, cognitive is the order the Three Grammars came into 
the world – and the order I encountered them in my own studies and research. All 
three grammars were responses to contemporary thinking: Chomsky’s generative 
grammar was a reaction to the dominant behaviourist ‘blank slate’ approach to 
language and language acquisition of the time; Halliday’s functional grammar was a 
reaction to Chomsky’s non-semantic, non-usage approach; while Langacker’s 
cognitive grammar came from a dissatisfaction with the limited explanatory power of 
generative grammar and the difficulty of devising a semantic grammar along 
generative lines. It was the generative semantics versus interpretative semantics 
controversy, dubbed The Linguistics Wars (Harris 1993), which led to the founding 
of cognitive linguistics by George Lakoff, Ronald Langacker and others. Langacker 
comments, rather despairingly, “This framework must indeed have been radically 
distinct, for mainstream generative theorists proved completely incapable of 
understanding it. To this very day, they have no idea what it is all about and why it 
might be interesting” (Langacker 2005: 101). 
I have identified the Three Grammars as representing shifts each towards one 
of the ontological realms of the sign, but their authors would not have seen their 
accounts as operating in just one realm without awareness of the other aspects of the 
sign. Generative grammar is not concerned only with visible structure but also the 
mental processes behind the manipulation of language – and is sometimes described 
as ‘cognitive’ for that reason; functional grammar is concerned as much with mental 
processes as it is with material processes in the external world – the ‘wheel’ graphic, 
referred to earlier, includes the ‘world of consciousness’ (sensing) and the ‘world of 
abstract relations’ (being) as well as the ‘physical world’ (doing) (Halliday 1994: 









representation. All three grammars are necessarily describing the same reality but 
approach the task from different perspectives. Semiotics provides us with a tool for 
understanding these fundamental differences. 
The Three Grammars have other features in common. Generative grammars 
are not the only ‘universal’ grammars; functional and cognitive grammars are also 
‘universal’ as they apply across languages: generative grammar by identifying a 
common innate mental ability for manipulating language forms, even though those 
forms differ from language to language; functional grammar by identifying 
metafunctions in the social world common to all speech communities, but realized 
differently from language to language; and cognitive grammar by virtue of the 
common organization of our brains, a common body plan and a common experience 
of the physical world through our senses, viewing language as a mental phenomenon, 
embodied and experiential, residing in the neurons of the brain.  
A criticism sometimes levelled at generative grammar is that it is ‘reductive’ 
as the methodological commitment of formalism involves “valuing maximally 
general analyses with a minimal number of types of primitives” (Croft 1998: 90), but 
this is a criticism which can be levelled at all three grammars because all theories 
‘reduce’. Functional and cognitive grammars, although both maximalist in their 
breadth, are reductive: Halliday’s grammar reduces the language system to 
metafunctional strands and Langacker’s to symbolic assemblies. It is only with a 
narrowed focus of attention that we are able to make general statements about real-
world phenomena. 
Describing grammar in terms of a deep and a surface structure is not shared 
by all three approaches, however. Halliday’s ‘deep grammar’ refers to the totality of 
the systems of language, where “All structure is surface, and all systemic choice is 
deep” (Kress 1976: xix), while Chomsky’s ‘deep structure’ (discarded in later 
theories) is “a much more abstract representation of grammatical relations and 
syntactic organization” than the ‘surface structure’ (Halliday 1976: 88). For 
Langacker, there is no deep or hidden structure as all structure, and therefore also 
meaning, is explicit (Langacker 1987: 27). 
I have characterized the Three Grammars as complementary rather than 
competing, shifts in focus rather than mutually exclusive versions. We are not 
required to make a choice to favour one system over the others, as all three are 
sincere and committed attempts to understand language and how it works in 
theoretical terms, written for their own sake, so the burden is not on the inventor to 
propose applications. Halliday’s functional grammar was the only grammar of the 
three devised expressly as an instrument of analysis, text analysis – but as the focal 
shift of this grammar is towards the realm of REALITY, this is perhaps not surprising. 
That said, all three grammars have found practical applications and have provided 
the basis for theories in areas such as child language acquisition, language teaching 
and translation/interpreting. For the purposes of analysing data, one approach over 
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another will suggest itself and the different foci of the Three Grammars determine 




5. Case Study 2 – Figurative language 
 
In this second case study, I look at how scholarship in the area of figurative (non-
literal) language – metaphor and metonymy – reflects the three ontological realms of 
the linguistic sign, and how the linear triadic model developed in this article provides 
a useful framework for making sense of the complex literature in this area. Research 
in recent decades has initiated a significant change in standpoint to one where 
metaphor and metonymy are just as much about thought as they are a matter of 
language, seeing figurative thought patterns as the embodiment of our direct 
experience of the physical world through the senses, rather than incidental or 
decorative. This new perspective means that now all three realms of the sign, 




5.1 Metaphor  
 
Metaphor was depicted traditionally as decorative language which belonged 
principally to the province of literature. New theory was developed first in poetics 
with the introduction of terms such as ‘tenor’, ‘vehicle’ and ‘ground’ (e.g. Leech 
1969) and the distinction between conventional and novel metaphor. In language 
teaching, metaphor traditionally equated with an interest in idioms, the colourful 
conventional metaphors students like to learn and teachers like to teach, which often 
have limited practical usefulness as linguistic resources because of their specificity, 
and therefore command little space in the syllabus. The early work in poetics and 
language teaching reflect a view of metaphor associated with isolated instances on 
the page, confined, in other words, to the ontological realm of LANGUAGE.  
Lakoff & Johnson’s (1980) revolutionary Metaphors We Live By triggered a 
radical change of direction. Metaphor now became characterized very differently: as 
essential rather than decorative; significant in all spheres of life, not only the domain 
of literature; and, most importantly, a phenomenon of thought as much as of 
language, originating from our common experience of the physical world through the 
senses. Then came a new move which combined metaphor studies with discourse 
analysis. This work shows how emergent metaphor and discourse metaphor play a 
role in communication in numerous different contexts in the real world. The 
Pragglejaz Group developed a system for metaphor detection in text and discourse 
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called MIP (Pragglejaz Group 2007). Other scholars developed Metaphor-Led 
Discourse Analysis (Cameron & Maslen 2010), corpus linguistic protocols for 
studying metaphor in discourse (Deignan 2005), and frameworks for analysing 
discourse phenomena involving metaphor and metonymy across longer stretches of 
language (Denroche 2018).  
The new direction which Lakoff & Johnson took is often referred to as the 
‘cognitive turn’ in metaphor studies and represents a move towards the mind and the 
realm of COGNITION; the perspective which the discourse-analysis approach to 
metaphor represents could be described as a ‘discourse turn’, a move towards activity 
in the real world and the realm of REALITY. These different perspectives have 
resulted in fierce debates around what metaphor is, each camp vehemently fighting 
their corner. An indicator of the maturity of Metaphor Studies as a discipline is 
reflected in the ability of contemporary scholars to embrace the many and diverse 
approaches to metaphor which now exist. Steen and Cameron are two scholars who 
bring different ways of framing and defining metaphor together into a single 
narrative. Steen depicts metaphor as “not all thought”, “not all language” and “not 
just language and thought”, but also a phenomenon which is interactive and 
‘emergent’ in communication in the real world (Steen 2008). Steen offers a three-
dimensional model of metaphor in which the dimensions are ‘naming’, ‘framing’ and 
‘changing’, the domains of language, cognition and communication, corresponding 
to the three ontological realms of the sign, LANGUAGE, COGNITION and REALITY. 
For Cameron, “the idea of metaphor encompasses multiple phenomena”; 
metaphor is many things: linguistic, cognitive, embodied, affective, sociocultural and 
dynamic (Cameron 2010: 3-7). This acknowledges that metaphor spans many fields 
of practice and that it is relevant to all three ontological realms of the sign: the realm 
of the LANGUAGE is reflected in the focus on metaphor as linguistic; the realm of 
COGNITION is reflected in metaphor as cognitive, embodied and affective; and the 
realm of REALITY is reflected in metaphor as sociocultural and dynamic. Cameron’s 
multi-dimensional model of metaphor is given as a preliminary to introducing the 
principles of ‘metaphor-led discourse analysis’ (MLDA), a brand of discourse 
analysis which focusses on metaphor, and a framework which emphasizes the 
involvement in communication of all three realms and constant interaction between 
them. 
Not only does overviewing the field in this way give us a clearer and more 
truthful picture of the field but it takes the sting out of the tail of many of the debates 
found in the literature. It introduces a sort of academic ‘conflict resolution’ allowing 
divergent theories to coexist. I see this as part of what could be described as a 
‘metonymic theory of knowledge’ where individual theories are complementary 
rather than competing, offering valid but partial truths, the parts coming together to 





The study of metonymy has seen a trajectory similar to the rise of metaphor, though 
occurring somewhat later and in its shadow. In recent decades, as a consequence of 
the cognitive turn, metonymy has gone from being considered a language 
phenomenon to one as much concerned with thought and embodiment; from a 
decorative, poetic trope to a mental process, essential in conceptualization and 
ubiquitous in everyday communication (Denroche 2015). For Radden, metonymy 
plays a role right across the linguistic hierarchy, “at all levels of linguistic structure: 
phonology, lexical grammar, morphology, grammar, and pragmatics” (Radden 2005: 
11), signs themselves are of necessity metonymic because they under-specify 
(Radden & Kövecses 1999: 24). These are all phenomena where a ‘figure’ is profiled 
against a ‘ground’. Langacker maintains that grammar is metonymic because the 
information it explicitly provides is less precise than the connections which speakers 
intend and hearers apprehend (Langacker 2009: 46).  
Recognizing the importance of metonymic thinking, metonymic forms and 
metonymic relations in the real world in everyday communication demonstrates that 
metonymy, like metaphor, is involved across all three ontological realms. Reference 
to the three realms in understanding metonymy therefore suggests itself as a useful 
framework. This is reflected in the title of Littlemore’s (2015) overview of the field 
of Metonymy Studies, Metonymy: Hidden Shortcuts in Language, Thought and 
Communication where ‘language’, ‘thought’ and ‘communication’ correspond to the 
realms of LANGUAGE, COGNITION and REALITY. While this is implied in Littlemore’s 
book title, Radden and Kövecses use the triad explicitly in their classification of 
metonymy types (Kövecses & Radden 1998, Radden & Kövecses 1999). Their 
“typology of metonymy-producing relationships” (Kövecses & Radden 1998: 43) 
takes the semiotic triangle of Ogden & Richards as their starting point and looks at 
which ontological realms are involved and which ‘routes’ are taken to access targets 
(Kövecses & Radden 1998: 40). They rename the realms thought, symbol and 
referent of Ogden & Richards’ model concept, word-form and thing/event, and gloss 
them “the world of ‘concepts’, the world of ‘forms’, in particular, forms of language, 
and the world of ‘things’ and ‘events’” (Radden & Kövecses 1999: 23).  
They identify three types of metonymy: SIGN METONYMY, where concept is 
accessed via form; REFERENCE METONYMY, where thing/event is accessed via form or 
concept and CONCEPT METONYMY, where concept is accessed via concept (Radden & 
Kövecses 1999: 28-29). They show that metonymic phenomena occur in all 
ontological realms and that pairings can cross ontological realms (Kövecses & 
Radden 1998: 41). They observe that ‘concept’ metonymies differ from ‘sign’ and 
‘reference’ metonymies in operating within the same realm (and in being reversible) 
and not across realms (Radden & Kövecses 1999: 29).  
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This framework shows how a semiotic approach helps clarify inconsistencies 
and issues which arise in the metonymy literature. Many debates in Metonymy 
Studies dissolve when viewed in terms of misunderstandings between scholars with 
different approaches to defining metonymy, or incompatibilities between cognitive, 
linguistic and social ‘real-world’ perspectives. For example, a conventional 
metonymy such as pay with plastic to mean ‘use a credit card’ will be a metonym to 
those taking a linguistic (or LANGUAGE) approach but not necessarily to those taking 
a cognitive (or COGNITION) approach, as the expression, if recognized as 
conventionalized, will be processed ‘directly’ and will not involve metonymic 
processing; while in discourse, when a metonymic idea organizes a long stretch of 
language, it may well be that no actual examples of linguistic metonyms are present 




5.3 Metaphor, metonymy and the Three Grammars 
 
In this section, I bring together the topics of the two case studies by looking at how 
the Three Grammars treat figurative (non-literal) language (metaphor and 
metonymy). To do this, I return to the foundational texts of Chomsky, Halliday and 
Langacker. Metaphor is mentioned just once in Chomsky’s Aspects of the Theory of 
Syntax in a historical overview of French philosophers, where we are advised that no 
special grammatical rules are needed for the description of ‘figurative speech’ 
(Chomsky 1965: 7). As metaphor is a semantic phenomenon as well as a formal one, 
it is destined to have only marginal relevance for generative grammar – metaphoric 
language is “outside the linguistic system, i.e. it is simply ill-formed” (Panther & 
Thornburg 2009: 12). In formal accounts, if mentioned at all, metaphor is 
characterized as aberrant or meaningless rather than central and meaningful, and 
metonymy is not mentioned at all. Panther & Thornburg make an analogy between 
the Chomskyan and Gricean solutions to figurative language: both view it as ‘deviant 
language use’ where rules are broken, but while for the former, selectional 
restrictions are violated, for the latter, the maxim of quality, ‘be truthful’, is flouted 
(Panther & Thornburg 2009: 12-13).  
In An Introduction to Functional Grammar Halliday defines metaphor as a 
word “used for something resembling that which it usually refers to; for example 
[…] stem the tide” (Halliday 1985: 319), thereby framing metaphor as non-standard; 
while metonymy is not discussed at all. Metaphor has no privileged position in 
functional grammar, a metaphor and a literal ‘equivalent’ representing separate 
categories only if the lexicogrammar shows systemic differences (Halliday 1985: 
xx). Metaphor is viewed in terms of choice, an alternative resource within the 
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potential of the language system for representing activity in the real and imagined 
worlds.  
There is a significant exception to this, and that is ‘grammatical metaphor’, to 
which a whole chapter of An Introduction to Functional Grammar is dedicated 
(Chapter 10 in Halliday 1985 and later editions). Grammatical metaphor is 
understood as the substitution of congruent (typical) forms with less congruent 
(metaphorical) forms, such as replacing The cast acted brilliantly with The cast’s 
brilliant acting + verb (Halliday 1993: 70). There are two types of grammatical 
metaphor in this account, ideational (metaphor of transitivity) and interpersonal 
(metaphor of mood); both involve the substitution of one grammatical class/structure 
for another, ‘identifying clauses’ typically replacing ‘material processes’ (Halliday 
1985: 321). These substitutions lead to greater ambiguity and a higher lexical density 
(Halliday 1993: 69), features typical of written English and the speech of 
professional registers. Such rewordings are not really metaphor at all in the cognitive 
linguistics sense, as they do not involve mapping from a source to a target domain, 
and are perhaps better described in terms of metonymy and ‘metonymic shift’ 
(Denroche 2015: 73-74). 
The picture is very different in cognitive linguistics where metaphor has 
always played an important role. Lakoff & Johnson’s (1980) revolutionary work 
recognized metaphor as basic to conceptualization and communication, and 
metaphoric language as the realization of metaphoric thought patterns (conceptual 
metaphors), involving mappings from a (usually) concrete source domain to a more 
abstract target domain, such as GOOD IS UP or LIFE IS A JOURNEY; these in turn are 
structured from more basic image schemas, such as the ‘containment’, ‘path’ and 
‘centre-periphery’ schemas, which reflect our common sensory experience of the 
world. Cognitive scholars propose that grammar itself is figurative, but metonymic 
rather than metaphoric (Langacker 2009), and that metonymy and metaphor motivate 
lexicogrammatical structure (Panther & Thornburg 2009). The grammatical 
metaphors of functional grammar may be viewed in terms of conceptual 
metonymies, such as THINGS FOR ACTIONS, motivating distributional properties of 
function words, grammatical morphemes and word classes (Panther & Thornburg 
2009: 16). 
This section has illustrated how the linguistic phenomenon of figurative 
language (metaphor and metonymy) is treated very differently and to differing depths 
by the Three Grammars, and how a semiotic framework can lend clarity in a complex 







6. Concluding remarks  
 
There have been two main aims to this article. The first was to show the validity of 
returning to basic and firmly established linguistics concepts, in this case the models 
of the sign of Peirce, Saussure and Ogden & Richards, and to show how these 
models can be developed in the light of new knowledge to provide new tools for 
linguistic research. I have presented an original linear triadic model of the sign with 
modifications to each of the ontological realms drawing on cognitive grammar. 
These reflect the abstract nature of items in the lexicon, the partial nature of meaning 
making in language, and complex ideas resulting from combining elements. They 
are: conceptual reification to show how ‘abstract things’ can be included in the realm 
of REALITY; construal to explain ‘narrowing’ at LANGUAGE; and construction to show 
how ‘complex thoughts’ can be incorporated at COGNITION. By addressing objections 
to the basic triadic model of the sign, the model is refined to make it more suited as a 
research tool.   
The second aim was to show that a semiotics perspective can give clarity in 
complex and multidisciplinary fields within linguistics by providing a heuristic tool 
to elucidate and resolve theoretical differences and contrasting positions. This I have 
demonstrated through two case studies. The first maps grammar systems onto the 
linear triadic model of the sign and explains why grammars fall into three broad 
categories. Each of the three approaches to grammar, the generative, the functional 
and the cognitive, glossed as the Three Grammars, represents a shift to one of the 
three points of the semiotic triangle, LANGUAGE, REALITY and COGNITION 
respectively. The second case study illustrates how the vast literature on figurative 
language (metaphor and metonymy) can also be made sense of by mapping the 
scholarly literature onto the realms of the sign.  
This article proposes that semiotics and models of the sign are directly 
relevant to contemporary research, as they offer explanatory tools which aid us in 
understanding and overviewing complex, multi-disciplinary topic fields within 
linguistics. It has shown that new theory can revitalize old theory, in this case, 
concepts from cognitive linguistics used to modify and consolidate the ontological 
realms of the sign. It was suggested that cognitive grammar is particularly useful in 
this respect as it offers a naturalistic grammar which is embodied and grounded in 
experience. Cognitive grammar, by focusing on mental processes, gets closer to 
production, the making and management of signs, and meaning-making taking place 







Atkin, A. (2013). Peirce’s theory of signs. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford 
encyclopedia of philosophy. 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/peirce-semiotics/>  [accessed 2 
March 2020]. 
 
Cameron, L. (2010). The discourse dynamics framework for metaphor. In L. 
Cameron & R. Maslen (Eds.), Metaphor analysis: Research practice in applied 
linguistics, social sciences and humanities (pp. 77–94). London: Equinox.  
 
Cameron, L., & Maslen, R. (Eds.). (2010). Metaphor analysis: Research practice in 
applied linguistics, social sciences and humanities. London: Equinox.  
 
Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic structures. The Hague: Mouton. 
 
Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Cowie, A. P. (Ed.). (1998). Phraseology: Theory, analysis and application. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
 
Croft, W. (1998). What (some) functionalists can learn from (some) formalists.  In 
M. Darnell, E. Moravcsik, F. J. Newmeyer, M. Noonan & K. M. Wheatley (Eds.), 
Functionalism and formalism in linguistics, vol. I (pp. 87-110). Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins. 
 
Croft, W. (2001). Radical construction grammar: Syntactic theory in typological 
perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Croft, W., & Cruse, D. A. (2004). Cognitive linguistics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Deignan, A. (2005). Metaphor and corpus linguistics. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.  
 
Denroche, C. T. (2015).  Metonymy and language: A new theory of linguistic 
processing. New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Denroche, C. T. (2018). Text metaphtonymy: The interplay of metonymy and 
metaphor in discourse. Metaphor and the Social World, 8(1), 1–24. 
 
 25 
Denroche, C. T. (2019). Employing cognitive metonymy theory in the analysis of 
semantic relations between source and target text in translation. Metaphor and the 
Social World, 9(2), 177–198. 
 
Fillmore, C. J. (2006 [1982]). Frame semantics. In D. Geeraerts (Ed.), Cognitive 
linguistics: Basic readings (pp. 373-400). Berlin & New York, NY: Mouton de 
Gruyter. Page references in the present article are to the 2006 work. 
 
Goldberg, A. E. (1995). Constructions: A construction grammar approach to 
argument structure. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Halliday, M. A. (1973). Explorations in the functions of language. London: Edward 
Arnold. 
 
Halliday, M. A. (1976). Deep grammar: System as semantic choice. In G. R. Kress 
(Ed.), Halliday: System and function in language. Selected papers (pp. 88-98). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Halliday, M. A. (1978). Language as social semiotic: The social interpretation of 
language and meaning. London: Edward Arnold. 
 
Halliday, M. A. (1985). An introduction to functional grammar (1st ed.). London: 
Edward Arnold. 
 
Halliday, M. A. (1993). Some grammatical problems in scientific English.  In M. A. 
Halliday & J. R. Martin (Eds.), Writing science; Literacy and discursive power (pp. 
69-85). London: The Falmer Press. 
 
Halliday, M. A. (1994). An introduction to functional grammar (2nd ed.). London: 
Edward Arnold. 
 
Harris, R. (1987). Reading Saussure: A critical commentary on the cours de 
linguistique générale. London: Duckworth. 
 
Harris, R. (1993). The linguistics wars. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hjelmslev, L. T. (1943/1953). Omkring sprogteoriens grundlkggelse (Danish text, 
Copenhagen, 1943). The 1953 English trans. by Francis Whitfield, Prolegomena to a 
theory of language (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press), was used in the 
present article.  
 
 26 
Jakobson, R. O. (1968). Language in relation to other communication systems. In 
Reports of the symposium on languages in society and in technique. Milan: Olivetti. 
 
Johansen, J. D. (1993). Dialogic semiosis: An essay on signs and meaning. 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.  
 
Kövecses, Z., & Radden, G. (1998). Metonymy: Developing a cognitive linguistic 
view. Cognitive Linguistics, 9(1), 37-77. 
   
Kress, G. R. (1976). Introduction.  In G. R. Kress (Ed.), Halliday: System and 
function in language. Selected papers (pp. vii-xxi). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Kress, G. R. (2010). Multimodality: A social semiotic approach to contemporary 
communication.  London: Routledge.  
 
Kress, G. R, & van Leeuwen, T. (1996). Reading images: The grammar of visual 
design.  London: Routledge. 
 
Lakoff, G. P., & Johnson, M. L. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Langacker, R. W. (1986). An introduction to cognitive grammar. Cognitive Science 
10, 1-40. 
 
Langacker, R. W. (1987). Foundations of cognitive grammar. Volume I: Theoretical 
prerequisites. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
 
Langacker, R. W. (2005). Construction grammars: Cognitive, radical, and less so.  In 
F. J. Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & M. Peña Cervel (Eds.), Cognitive linguistics: 
Internal dynamics and interdisciplinary interaction (pp. 101-159). Berlin: Mouton de 
Gruyter.  
 
Langacker, R. W. (2009). Metonymic grammar. In K. Panther, L. L. Thornburg & A. 
Barcelona (Eds.), Metonymy and metaphor in grammar (pp. 45–71). Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins. 
 
Langacker, R. W. (2013). Essentials of cognitive grammar.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.   
 
Leech, G. N. (1969). A linguistic guide to English poetry. London: Longman.   
 
 27 
Littlemore, J. (2015). Metonymy: Hidden shortcuts in language, thought and 
communication. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Lyons, J. (1981). Language, meaning and context. Fontana Paperbacks. 
 
Newmeyer, F. J. (1998). Language form and language function. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press.  
 
Nuyts, J. (2005). Brothers in arms? On the relations between cognitive and functional 
linguistics.  In F. J. Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & M. Peña Cervel (Eds.), Cognitive 
linguistics: Internal dynamics and interdisciplinary interaction (pp. 69-100).  Berlin: 
Mouton de Gruyter.  
 
Ogden, C. K., & Richards, I. A. (1923/1949). The meaning of meaning (10th ed.). 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 
Panther, K., & Thornburg, L. L. (2009). Introduction: On figuration in grammar. In 
K. Panther, L. L. Thornburg & A. Barcelona (Eds.), Metonymy and metaphor in 
grammar (pp. 1–44). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
 
Peirce, C. S. (1955). Philosophical writings of Peirce. Edited by Justus Buchler. New 
York, NY: Dover. 
 
Pragglejaz Group. (2007). MIP: A method for identifying metaphorically used words 
in discourse. Metaphor and Symbol, 22(1), 1–39.  
 
Radden, G. (2005). The ubiquity of metonymy. In J. Otal Campo, I. Navarro i 
Ferrando & B. Bellés Fortuña (Eds.), Cognitive and discourse approaches to 
metaphor and metonymy (pp. 11-28). Castello de la Plana: Universitat Jaume I.  
 
Radden, G., & Dirven, R. (2007). Cognitive English grammar. Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins. 
 
Radden, G., & Kövecses, Z. (1999). Towards a theory of metonymy. In K. Panther & 
G. Radden (Eds.), Metonymy in language and thought (pp. 17-59). Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins.  
 
Saussure, F. de. (1916). Cours de linguistique générale. Paris, France: Payot. 
 
 28 
Saussure, F. de. (1916/1959). Course in general linguistics. English translation of 
Cours de linguistique générale (1916) by Wade Baskin. New York, NY: 
Philosophical Library.  
 
Saussure, F. de. (1916/1983). Course in general linguistics. English translation of 
Cours de linguistique générale (1916) by Roy Harris. London: Duckworth. 
 
Sinclair, J. (1991). Corpus, concordance, collocation. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
 
Steen, G. J. (2008). The paradox of metaphor: Why we need a three-dimensional 
model of metaphor. Metaphor and Symbol. 23(4), 213-241.  
 
Whorf, B. L. (1956). Language, thought and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin 
Lee Whorf. Edited by John Carroll. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
 
